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Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences*
MURAT C. MUNGAN† & JONATHAN KLICK‡
There is a 250-year-old presumption in the criminology and law enforcement
literature that people are deterred more by increases in the certainty rather than
increases in the severity of legal sanctions. We call this presumption the Certainty
Aversion Presumption (CAP). Simple criminal decision-making models suggest that
criminals must be risk seeking if they behave consistently with CAP. This implication
leads to disturbing interpretations, such as criminals being categorically different
from law-abiding people, who often display risk-averse behavior while making
financial decisions. Moreover, policy discussions that incorrectly rely on criminals’
risk attitudes implied by CAP are ill informed, and may therefore have unintended
negative consequences.
In this Article, we first demonstrate, contrary to most of the existing literature,
that CAP-consistent behavior does not imply risk-seeking behavior. A host of
considerations that are unrelated to risk attitudes can generate behavior that is
consistent with CAP, including stigmatization, discounting, judgment proofness,
the forfeitability of illegal gains, and the possibility of being punished for
unsuccessful criminal attempts. Next, we discuss empirical methods that can be
employed to gain a better understanding of criminals’ risk attitudes and
responsiveness to various punishment schemes. These methods focus on the various
non-risk-related-considerations that may be responsible for CAP-consistent
behavior. Finally, we discuss the importance of gaining a better understanding of
criminals’ attitudes for purposes of designing optimal law enforcement methods,
punishment schemes for repeat offenders, plea bargaining procedures, and
standards of proof.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a presumption in the law and economics literature that criminals are more
deterred by the certainty of punishment than by the severity of punishment,1 leading
many legal scholars to infer that criminals are risk seeking.2 Scholars of law and
economics may find this inference disturbing; criminals would thus make decisions
in an intrinsically different way than noncriminals, who are assumed to be risk
averse.3 Of more fundamental importance is the fact that legal scholars make

1. CESARE BECCARIA-BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 93 (Edward
D. Ingraham trans., 2d Am. ed., Academic Reprints 1953) (1819) (“Crimes are more
effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment.” (emphasis in
original)); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 36 (5th ed. 2009)
(citing Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of
Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 42 JUST. Q. 173 (1987)).
2. E.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 207–08 (1968) (implying that criminals are risk seeking because the greater
deterrent effect of certainty shows that criminals would prefer a risky punishment scheme);
Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking Criminal Trial Bifurcation,
61 U. TORONTO L.J. 811, 820 (2011) (arguing for comparative sentencing and observing that
the argument rests on risk-seeking attitudes); see also Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety,
Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to
Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 138 (1995) (attempting empirically to
determine criminal risk attitudes); James Foreman-Peck & Simon C. Moore, Gratuitous
Violence and the Rational Offender Model, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 160, 161 (2010) (putting
forth the inference from certainty aversion to risk seeking as one of two paradoxes confronting
the rational-offender model when considering risk preferences).
3. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 106 (1973) (“‘[T]he
offender may differ from his law-abiding neighbor simply in being prepared to violate the law
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recommendations and observations that rely on assumptions about criminal risk
preferences.4 Is this inference that criminals are risk seekers truly justified? In this
Article, we demonstrate that there are numerous reasons for why this conclusion may
be wrong, propose empirical methods to better understand criminal risk attitudes, and
discuss how important the issue is in light of its direct effect on criminal policy. We
start with a brief introduction of the concepts and presumptions central to our
analysis.
Risk aversion, one of the focal concepts in our analysis, refers to a person’s
reluctance to invest in assets with uncertain payoffs, even if such investment would
on average benefit that person.5 Conversely, a person who is risk seeking would
invest in assets with uncertain payoffs even if the expected returns from those assets
are slightly negative.
Economic analysis of crime suggests that a 250-year-old presumption might be at
odds with the generalization that people are usually risk averse.6 Cesare Beccaria

untroubled by the uncertainties which alone deter his neighbor.’” (quoting JOHN COHEN,
CHANCE, SKILL, AND LUCK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GUESSING AND GAMBLING 39 (1960)));
William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, On Criminals’ Risk Attitudes, 55 ECON. LETTERS 97, 97
(1997) (observing that if criminals are risk seeking, they would be distinct from law-abiding
citizens).
4. See Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics:
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 276, 298–99 (1999) (assuming that criminals are risk seeking with respect to
imprisonment and thus justifying uniform sanctions); see also Fisher, supra note 2; Oren
Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 384 (2012) (stating
that defendants are generally risk seeking but that innocent defendants may exhibit more
risk-seeking behavior than guilty defendants (citing Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion
and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209 (1999) (“[T]he most convincing basis for why
defendants plead guilty despite loss aversion is that defendants are risk seeking in the domain
of losses . . . .” (emphasis in original)))); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A
Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497,
1552 (1974) (citing William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes
Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693, 705–06 (1973) (claiming on
grounds of risk preferences that raising the severity of fines has more deterrent effect than
raising enforcement probability in the antitrust setting)). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2495 (2004)
(“Prosecutorial bluffing is likely to work particularly well against innocent defendants, who
are on average more risk averse than guilty defendants.”).
5.
A decision maker is said to be risk averse if that person starting from a position
of certainty rejects the addition of any fair gamble to that certain starting position.
Adding a fair gamble to a nonrandom starting position yields a gamble whose
mean value is the same as the initial nonrandom starting value. Thus, a certain
starting position is converted to a random one with the same mean. Risk aversion
is always avoiding such a change.
Jack Meyer, The Theory of Risk and Risk Aversion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 99, 106 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014) (italics in
original) (footnote omitted).
6. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93; Becker, supra note 2, at 207–08; Isaac
Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in ESSAYS IN THE

794

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:791

published Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishment) in 1764, in which he
claimed that certainty rather than severity of punishment has a greater deterrent
effect.7 Gary Becker, in his famous article titled Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, published in 1968, first endorsed Beccaria’s presumption and
then demonstrated that it implies that criminals, contrary to the rest of the population,
must be risk seeking.8
Are criminals really different from the rest of the population in their risk attitudes?
If not, is there something wrong with Beccaria’s presumption or Becker’s analysis?
Answering these questions requires an analysis of Becker’s theory of crime and
deterrence, as well as empirical studies investigating Beccaria’s presumption. These
questions deserve attention, not only because of their academic value in
understanding criminal decision-making processes, but also because their answers
are crucial to identifying cost-effective policies to reduce crime. If criminals’ risk
attitudes can be identified, they can be used to design more effective law enforcement
methods.
The primary goal of this Article is to identify potential empirical methods to
identify criminals’ risk attitudes. To do this, we review previous commentaries as
well as theoretical and empirical studies that relate to the topic. We show that
Becker’s analysis and its later interpretations abstract from a number of potentially
important considerations. We demonstrate that when these considerations are taken
into account, Beccaria’s presumption does not imply that criminals are risk seeking.
This observation allows us to form testable hypotheses concerning the relevance of
various considerations that Beckerian models abstract from and discuss various
empirical methods that can be employed to test such hypotheses. We begin by
considering Becker’s seminal piece on the economics of crime and deterrence.
In 1968, Gary Becker applied modern economic theory to analyze crime and
criminal decision making.9 After his seminal contribution, a very broad literature on
the economics of deterrence and law enforcement emerged.10 A crucial assumption
in the Beckerian approach is that criminals react to incentives and that they can
potentially be deterred from committing crime.11 In the simplest Beckerian
framework, deterrence is achieved through the threat of punishment. This threat
consists of two components: certainty and severity of punishment. These two
components generate a perceived threat of punishment. If a potential criminal’s
expected benefit from crime outweighs this perceived threat, then he commits the

ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 68, 75 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974).
7. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93.
8. Becker, supra note 2, at 207–08.
9. Id.
10. See generally Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON.
SURVS. 267 (1997) (reviewing the law and economics literature on optimal law enforcement);
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,
38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000).
11. Most theory articles take this assumption for granted. However, there are exceptions
in the literature, where some criminals are assumed to be nondeterrable. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Miceli & Catherine Bucci, A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 1
REV. L. & ECON. 71 (2005). In these alternative settings, nondeterrable individuals can be
thought of as gaining extremely high benefits from crime.
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crime. The aggregate level of deterrence is simply the number of potential criminals
whose criminal benefits are offset by the perceived threat of punishment.
After this simple framework was developed, it was used to test many hypotheses.
In particular, it was used to discuss the validity of Beccaria’s assertion that “[c]rimes
are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment.”12
This presumption was accepted by influential scholars, as it appears to be intuitive.13
The presumption continued drawing attention from economists and criminologists.
Empirical studies, which reported results that support it, were conducted to
investigate its validity.14 We refer to this presumption as the “Certainty Aversion
Presumption” (CAP).
Some interpretations of CAP are somewhat disturbing; within the simple
Beckerian model of crime and deterrence, criminals must be risk seeking if they
behave in a manner consistent with CAP.15 “This would make criminals different
from the rest of the population, because the other types of analysis have established
that law-abiding citizens tend to be risk averse.”16 Various scholars responded by
offering alternative explanations of CAP that do not rely on inherent differences
between criminals and noncriminals. Existing studies that provide such explanations
include Neilson and Winter (1997), Block and Lind (1975), and Mungan and Klick
(2014).17
Neilson and Winter use tools from decision theory18 that are capable of
conveniently incorporating fixed costs associated with convictions. Such fixed costs

12. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93 (emphasis in original).
13. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 178 (“This approach also has an interesting
interpretation of the presumed greater response to a change in the probability than in the
punishment. . . . The widespread generalization that offenders are more deterred by the
probability of conviction than by the punishment when convicted turns out to imply in the
expected-utility approach that offenders are risk preferrers . . . .”); see also JAMES Q. WILSON
& RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 397–401 (1985) (citing various
studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s to discuss the deterrent effects of increases in
the certainty and severity of punishment). The main point made by Wilson and Herrnstein is
that an increase in the severity, if not accompanied by an increase in the probability of
punishment, does not have a great deterrent effect.
14. See, e.g., Block & Gerety, supra note 2; Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of
Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297 (1991).
15. A proof of this result is provided by many economists, and in different settings. See,
e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 178; Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 77–78; Neilson & Winter, supra
note 3, at 98.
16. Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 97.
17. See id.; Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes
Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479 (1975); Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan
Klick, Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, Attempts, and Implied Risk Preferences, 43 J. LEGAL STUD.
137 (2014).
18. In particular, the authors use state-dependent and rank-dependent expected utilities to
demonstrate their points. State-dependent utilities are used to capture the idea that a person’s
enjoyment of wealth (or other things) can be affected by factors that are not directly related to
his wealth. A convict may enjoy his wealth less, for instance, if the stigma attached to his
conviction reduces his ability to share and enjoy his wealth with others (who upon his
conviction have distanced themselves from him). Rank-dependent expected utilities, on the
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are present when a person is stigmatized for being convicted, or if an ex-convict can
simply no longer enjoy his wealth as much as he could before conviction. Block and
Lind develop a model where criminals are risk averse in wealth, but risk seeking in
sentences, and still obey CAP.19 Block and Lind’s article highlights the fact that risk
attitudes have different meanings in different contexts, and that criminals need not
be different from the rest of society simply because they are risk seeking in sentences.
As demonstrated in their paper, behavior that is consistent with risk seeking in
sentences can be the product of something that is commonly assumed of
noncriminals, namely discounting of future sentences.20
The explanations offered by Neilson and Winter and Block and Lind rely
mainly on the sanction being nonmonetary. When sanctions are, to the contrary,
monetary, fixed costs of conviction (stigmatization or loss of the ability to enjoy
wealth) and discounting of future sentences are not as relevant. We recently
offered a new and separate explanation as to how CAP and the presumption that
criminals are risk averse can be reconciled.21 We make the observation that simple
crime-and-deterrence models ignore the possibilities of forfeiture of illegal gains and
being caught while attempting a crime. When elimination of illegal gains to the
criminal through these possibilities is a real concern,
increasing the probability of detection leads to an increase in the
expected monetary fine as well as a reduction in expected benefits. In
contrast, an increase in the sanction increases only the expected monetary
fine but does not affect the expected benefits of crime. Therefore, it is
only natural that potential offenders contemplating such crimes are more
sensitive to increases in the probability of detection rather than an
increase in monetary fines, even if they are risk-averse expected-utility
maximizers.22
Each of the briefly reviewed explanations as to why criminals may appear to be
risk seeking relies on different aspects of the criminal’s decision-making process.
Determining which, if any, of these aspects are truly relevant requires an empirical
analysis capable of generating evidence that can be used to support or refute the
explanations provided in the literature. Having a better understanding of which
explanations are relevant is important for enabling a discussion of policy

other hand, are used to formalize the idea that people can attach different weights to increases
in the probability of an event based on the initial probability of that event. A person may
heavily discount very low probabilities and may therefore be unresponsive to increases in such
probabilities. For instance, a person may not be able to tell the difference between 0.000001
and 0.000002, and therefore may be almost indifferent between catastrophic events that
happen with these two probabilities, despite the fact that the second probability is twice as
large as the first one.
19. Block & Lind, supra note 17.
20. See id. at 481; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and
Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–7 (1999)
(demonstrating that discounting implies risk seeking in sentences).
21. Mungan & Klick, supra note 17.
22. Id. at 141.
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implications. Once criminals’ preferences are better understood, it will be easier to
identify cost-effective strategies in deterring crime.23
In this Article, we identify hypotheses capable of distinguishing between the
various assumptions identified in the previous literature and propose empirical
strategies to test these hypotheses. For example, the hypotheses suggest different
effects of increasing the certainty of punishment across property and violent crimes.
While many empirical papers on criminal deterrence have noted differential effects
between property and violent crimes, virtually no one has linked this effect
heterogeneity to a structural model of criminal decision making. This Article
provides a starting point for a more complete understanding of the behavioral
mechanisms through which deterrence works.
The remaining parts of this Article are structured as follows. Part I reviews the
development of CAP and how it implies risk-seeking behavior in standard
crime-and-deterrence models. In this Part, to avoid any ambiguity in the definition
of CAP and its implications, we also provide a brief review of technical concepts
related to risk and risk attitudes.
Part II reviews ideas that have been presented in the existing law and economics
literature that challenge the proposition that CAP implies risk-seeking behavior. In
particular, it presents simplified versions of models proposed by Neilson and Winter,
Block and Lind, and us. We highlight the assumptions that each model relies on,
provide intuitive interpretations of each, and demonstrate that they are different. In
particular, Neilson and Winter rely on stigmatization costs and/or a reduction in
ex-convicts’ ability to enjoy wealth, Block and Lind assume discounting of future
sentences, and in our previous articles we focus on the forfeitability of illegal gains
and the discounting of monetary benefits. Distinguishing between these assumptions
allows us to design empirical methods (discussed in Part III) that can potentially
reveal which of these three models may reconcile CAP with the belief that even
criminals are risk averse. This Part also discusses the meaning of risk preferences in
detail. We emphasize that special attention should be paid to the domain over which
risk is defined when interpreting risk. As such, we draw a distinction between risks
over monetary outcomes versus risks over nonmonetary outcomes.
In Part III we propose empirical methods to test whether (1) criminals discount
outcomes in the future, (2) stigma is an important concern for potential offenders,
and (3) criminals are risk seeking over monetary outcomes. Each of these behavioral
hypotheses suggests effect heterogeneity when it comes to the effects of changing
criminal policy variables with respect to the type of crime committed as well as
observable attributes of the criminal himself.
Part IV discusses the importance of having a better understanding of criminals’
risk preferences. In particular, we demonstrate that optimal enforcement strategies

23. See e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20 (demonstrating how more effective
deterrent sanctions can be designed if we have knowledge on criminals’ responsiveness to
certainty versus severity of punishment); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal
Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979)
(showing how information on criminals’ risk aversion can be used to design sanction schemes
that achieve greater deterrence); see also infra Part IV and the sources cited therein for other
contexts in which knowledge about criminals’ risk preferences can be used to design
punishment schemes and procedures that enhance deterrence.
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depend crucially on various assumptions concerning criminal behavior. The issues
that we consider include (1) the optimal probability and punishment for various
offenses, (2) optimal plea-bargain offers, (3) optimal punishments for repeat
offenders, and (4) discretion in sentencing.
I. THE CERTAINTY AVERSION PRESUMPTION
A. A Short History of CAP
Cesare Beccaria’s comments concerning the effects of the severity and certainty
of punishment form the basis for what we term CAP:
Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity
of punishment. Hence in a magistrate the necessity of vigilance, and in a
judge of implacability, which, that it may become an useful virtue,
should be joined to a mild legislation. The certainty of a small
punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one more
severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature of
mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest inevitable evil,
whilst hope, the best gift of Heaven, hath the power of dispelling the
apprehension of a greater, especially if supported by examples of
impunity, which weakness or avarice too frequently afford.24
Modern social scientists have speculated about the potential historical and
institutional reasons for why thinkers of the classical school in criminology, such as
Beccaria, Bentham, and Montesquieu, might have subscribed to this view. In
particular, as Professor van den Haag states:
Bentham and Beccaria thought that the certainty of punishment (of
paying) is most important if the punishment (the price) is to deter. This
stress on certainty is sometimes used to question the comparative
effectiveness of severity. But Bentham and Beccaria meant to correct a
contemporary situation: in the eighteenth century penalties were still
extremely severe, but they were, perhaps for this reason, haphazardly
applied and therefore uncertain. Uncertainty reduced or even nullified
the deterrent effect.25
Whether the “contemporary situation” that allegedly pushed Bentham and
Beccaria to form CAP has changed is debatable. It appears, however, that CAP has
continued to be accepted by social scientists. Professor Mendes suggests that in the
twentieth century, social scientists continued to show interest in CAP and “insisted
on distinguishing the relative importance of the certainty and severity of
punishment.”26 This trend continued in the field of economics, as is best exemplified
by Gary Becker’s seminal article on crime and punishment:

24. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93 (emphasis in original).
25. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 115 (1975).
26. Silvia M. Mendes, Certainty, Severity, and Their Relative Deterrent Effects:
Questioning the Implications of the Role of Risk in Criminal Deterrence Policy, 32 POL’Y
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[A] common generalization by persons with judicial experience is that a
change in the probability has a greater effect on the number of offenses
than a change in the punishment,27 although, as far as I can tell, none of
the prominent theories shed any light on this relation.28
Gary Becker’s last sentence reflects the fact that in the late 1960s, the presumption
was not yet explained through economic theory. Furthermore, to the best of our
knowledge, by then no empirical studies sought to test its validity. Becker’s seminal
work published in 1968, which will be reviewed in the end of this Part, focused on
providing a theoretical rationale as to why certainty, rather than severity, has a greater
effect in deterring crime. Soon thereafter, empirical studies were conducted to test
CAP.29
In 1991, economist Jeffrey Grogger published a paper titled “Certainty vs.
Severity of Punishment,” which is cited frequently as providing strong evidence
supporting the validity of CAP.30 Grogger estimated criminals’ responsiveness to
increases in the severity and certainty of punishment by employing an empirical
model that used official arrest records from the California Department of Justice.31
Later, in 1995, Block and Gerety conducted a study by inviting students and
criminals to participate in laboratory experiments.32 Block and Gerety concluded that
students responded more to increases in severity; whereas, criminals responded more
to increases in the certainty of punishment.33
Reexamining Grogger’s results, however, it appears that they probably do not
provide strong evidence of CAP. Essentially, Grogger used a sample of California
criminals and simply ran regressions of the number of times these individuals were
arrested in 1986.34 To measure the expected probability of punishment, Grogger took
the number of times the individual was convicted of a crime prior to 1986 and divided

STUD. J. 59, 62 (2004).
27. “For example, Lord Shawness [sic] (1965) said, ‘Some judges preoccupy themselves
with methods of punishment. This is their job. But in preventing crime it is of less significance
than they like to think. Certainty of detection is far more important than severity of
punishment.’” Becker, supra note 2, at 176 n.12 (quoting Lord Shawcross, Crime Does Pay
Because We Do Not Back Up the Police, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 13, 1965, at 44).
28. Becker, supra note 2, at 176.
29. See e.g., Block & Gerety, supra note 2; Klára Faragó, Orhidea Kiss & János Boros,
Risk-Taking in Entrepreneurs, Compared to Criminals and Students: The Role of Uncertainty
and Stakes, 37 J. SOCIO-ECON. 2231 (2008); Thorsten Pachur, Yaniv Hanoch & Michaela
Gummerum, Prospects Behind Bars: Analyzing Decisions Under Risk in a Prison Population,
17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 630 (2010); David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence
Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence (Princeton Univ. Griswold Ctr. for Econ.
Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 189, 2009), available at https://www.princeton.edu
/ceps/workingpapers/189lee.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ3M-EF5C].
30. Michael Cain, Is Crime Giffen?, 16 J. FIN. CRIME 80, 81 (2009); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime,
Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 62 (1996); Neilson and
Winter, supra note 3, at 97; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 7 n.18.
31. Grogger, supra note 14, at 298.
32. Block & Gerety, supra note 2.
33. Id. at 138.
34. Grogger, supra note 14, at 299.
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it by the number of times the individual was arrested.35 For the expected severity of
the punishment, Grogger used the average prison sentence the individual had
previously served.36 Examining count data models, Grogger found that the severity
measure generated a small negative coefficient that was not statistically significant.37
In contrast, he found a negative coefficient for the probability of punishment
measurement that was both larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the severity
variable and was statistically significant.38 Based on these results, Grogger
concludes, “This evidence suggests that increased certainty of punishment provides
a much more effective deterrent than increased severity and calls into question the
wisdom of relying on lengthier prison sentences as a means to decrease crime.”39
Upon reflection, it is clear that both of these metrics are problematic. It is not at
all clear that individuals simply use their own private experience in determining their
expectations of the probability and severity of punishment. Furthermore, the Grogger
study suffers from deeper problems. First, it is simply not possible to conclude that
one variable has a stronger effect than another based simply on whether one is
statistically significant while the other is not. All sorts of things can lead to one
estimate being less precise than another40 (and therefore being less likely to be
statistically significant) that have little to do with the “true” effect of a variable on an
outcome. Second, in neither case is there a reasonable claim that the research design
allows for a credible identification strategy wherein the probability or severity
measures can be treated as if they were randomly assigned, allowing for confidence
in the causal inferences being made.41,42 Nonetheless, the Grogger paper is frequently
cited as evidence of CAP.
Block and Gerety’s work comes closer to demonstrating CAP and provides some
direct comparisons between criminal and noncriminal populations. They
implemented a contract-bidding experiment in which there was the opportunity to
increase profits through bid rigging (i.e., collusion).43 However, the researchers
provided a potential punishment for such collusive behavior, manipulating both the

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 303 tbl.3.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 304.
40. For example, sampling variation may be larger for one variable than for another.
Additionally, the effects of omitted variable bias may lead one variable to generate a
statistically significant effect while another does not, even if the insignificant factor is actually
more important.
41. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-39, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507324 [https://perma.cc/E8BG-JFPY].
42. Even if these problems did not exist, however, valid direct comparisons of the effects
are not provided, as Grogger never presents elasticity estimates. Thus, his conclusion is based
on a comparison of the percentage change in the number of arrests for a unit change in the
likelihood of being convicted (which is a probability), versus a percentage change in the
number of arrests for a unit change in severity (measured in months). An elasticity calculation
would examine the changes in the policy variables in their percentage change forms,
eliminating the difference in the units being used.
43. Block & Gerety, supra note 2, at 125–26.
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likelihood that the punishment would be applied and the size of the punishment.44
They ran the experiment on two groups of people: (1) a presumably noncriminal
group of college students from the University of Arizona and (2) a group of inmates
from an Arizona state prison.45
Block and Gerety found that while the student group was more responsive to
changes in the severity of the punishment, the prisoner group actually appeared to be
more likely to engage in collusion as the severity of the punishment increased,
suggesting that the prisoners were risk loving.46 Interestingly enough, in response to
hypothetical survey questions, the student and prisoner groups looked much more
similar, with both exhibiting risk aversion.47 However, the results from the
experiments, which involved decision making with real financial consequences and
which are not subject to the omitted-variable bias problems raised in the context of
the Grogger paper, provide the strongest empirical evidence for CAP among
criminals.48
These empirical and experimental results received great attention, because in the
Beckerian model of crime and deterrence CAP seems to imply that criminals must be
risk loving. This would separate criminals from the rest of the society, which appears
to consist mainly of risk avoiders.49 If true, this would mean that criminals are
different from the rest of the population in an important and identifiable way—one
that does not have much to do with the actual pleasure that they derive from
illegitimate activity, namely their risk attitudes.
B. Risk & Lotteries
To analyze and identify risk attitudes, economists make use of what they call
lotteries.50 Consider for instance a lottery that results in an award of $50 with a

44. Id. at 126.
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id. at 134–35.
47. See id. at 136 tbl.5.
48. That said, one may always question the external validity of experiments like these.
Presumably, none of the prisoners was arrested for antitrust violations. This raises the question
of whether one can simply extrapolate decision-making tendencies in one criminal context to
the domain of the more relevant criminal context the individual is likely to be involved in
when it comes to real life.
49. See Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 97.
50. One may also use utility functions to represent risk attitudes. In particular, let U be a
potential offender’s utility function and let w be the monetary equivalent of his initial position.
In the Beckerian framework, this person will commit crime if:
U(w) < pU(w + b − s) + (1 − p) U (w + b),
where b is the monetary equivalent of his gain from crime, s is the criminal sanction, and p is
the probability of being punished. Utility functions capture potential offenders’ risk attitudes
by allowing a representation of their marginal benefit from an additional unit of income. If a
person has diminishing marginal returns, then it is said that U is concave and that he is risk
averse. If, to the contrary, he has increasing marginal returns, then it is said that U is convex,
or equivalently that the person is risk loving. See Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles:
Using a Law and Economics Approach To Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That
Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More Than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 66 n.96
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probability of 0.7 and an award of $100 with a probability of 0.3. If we call this
lottery L, it can be compactly expressed as L = (0.7, 0.3 ; 50, 100). The expected
returns from lottery L would be given by (0.7 × 50) + (0.3 × 100) = 65, which can
compactly be expressed as E[L] = 65.
Using this notation, certain risk attitudes can be conveniently identified and
studied. A person is risk averse if he prefers the expected return of the lottery to the
lottery itself.51 Alternatively, a risk-averse individual is one who prefers the lottery
with the smallest variance52 among lotteries that have the same expected values. This
definition of risk aversion conforms to the intuitive meaning conveyed by the term;
a risk-averse person prefers certain outcomes over uncertain outcomes, hence,
avoiding risk.
To exemplify, consider two lotteries: A = (0.5, 0.5 ; 70, 30) and B = (0.5, 0.5 ; 80,
20). Although both lotteries have the same expected value (i.e., E[A] = E[B] = 50),
they have different variances.53 B has a greater variance, because the possible awards
are distributed more extremely than they are distributed in A. Accordingly, a
risk-averse individual would prefer A.
A risk-seeking individual, on the other hand, would prefer B over A, and exactly
for the opposite reason for why risk-averse individuals prefer A over B. One should,
however, be careful in interpreting the meaning of risk-seeking attitudes. Risk
seekers are not assumed to derive pleasure from the mere existence of a probable
loss. The reason that they prefer B over A is that they place more value on the prospect
of winning an additional $10 in B’s good state of the world (A would pay $70, and B
would pay $80 in this state of the world, making the difference $10) than they place
on not winning an additional $10 in B’s bad state of the world (A would pay $30, and
B would pay $20 in this state of the world).
It is also worth clarifying the meaning of risk neutrality. A risk-neutral person
would be equally happy with either lottery (A or B), because a risk-neutral individual
ranks lotteries only based on their expected values, and A and B have the same
expected value of $50.

(2006) (providing a simple explanation of utility functions and risk attitudes as relevant to this
debate).
51. This is the Arrow-Pratt definition of risk aversion, which is equivalent to the
Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of risk aversion under expected utility. The Rothschild-Stiglitz
definition of risk aversion would require an individual to prefer the lottery with the lower
variance between two lotteries that share the same expected value. Conversely, a
risk-preferring individual would choose the lottery with greater variance. See, e.g., Jan
Werner, Risk and Risk Aversion When States of Nature Matter, 41 ECON. THEORY 231 (2009)
(explaining the Arrow-Pratt definition, the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition, and other definitions
of risk aversion).
52. “If X is a random variable with expected value E(X), the variance of X is
Var (X) = E{[X − E(X)]2}
provided that the expectation exists.” JOHN A. RICE, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND DATA
ANALYSIS 131 (3d ed. 2007).
53. In particular, let V[A] and V[B] denote the variance associated with each lottery. It
follows that V[A] = [0.5 × (70 − 50)2] + [0.5 × (30 − 50)2] = 400 < V[B] = [0.5 × (80 − 50)2]
+ [0.5 × (20 − 50)2] = 900.
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C. CAP Implies Risk-Seeking Behavior in Becker’s Model
The definition of risk provided in Part I.B is convenient for demonstrating why
CAP implies that criminals must be risk seeking in Beckerian models. Before we
proceed, however, it is useful to provide a more precise definition of CAP to
eliminate ambiguities and to provide a simple notation explaining the Beckerian
model.
1. CAP and Percentage Increases
To demonstrate how CAP implies risk-seeking behavior54 it is useful to give a
more precise definition of what is meant by certainty having a greater deterrent effect
than severity. To ensure a meaningful analysis, we must consider increases in
severity and certainty that have similar magnitudes. In economics and statistics, this
is done by comparing equal percentage increases.55 For instance, if the certainty of
punishment is 50%, and if the punishment is monetary and equal to $500, then an
increase of 10% in certainty and an increase of $100 in the sanction would be equal
percentage increases (since both are 20% increases). We can now give a more precise
definition of CAP: the presumption is that a percentage increase in the certainty of
punishment has a greater deterrent effect than an equal percentage increase in the
severity of punishment.56
2. Simple Notation for the Beckerian Model
In Becker’s model, potential criminals benefit from committing crime, and dislike
being punished.57 Therefore, they commit crime if their benefit is sufficiently high,

54. See generally Becker, supra note 2, at 178 n.19 (providing the first proof that under
general assumptions of the expected-utility model, CAP implies risk-seeking preferences);
Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 77 (noting that “[t]he deterrent effect of a 1 per cent increase in the
marginal or average penalty per offense can be shown to . . . fall short of that of a similar
increase in the probability of apprehension and punishment if the offender is a . . . risk
preferrer”); Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 138 n.5 (citing Becker’s proof, then modifying
the analysis to include forfeiture of illegal gains); Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 98
(proving that under normal assumptions CAP implies risk-seeking preferences, then
modifying the analysis to include state-dependent preferences).
55. See, e.g., Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 137–38; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note
20, at 2. Mathematically, if U is the utility function, this corresponds to comparing
–

∂U p
∂U s
and –
.
∂p U
∂s U

56. Mathematically, the CAP corresponds to the presumption that
–

∂U p
∂U s
>–
.
∂p U
∂s U

57. See Becker, supra note 2, at 176–77 (characterizing this approach as a “usual analysis
of choice”).
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or if the expected punishment associated with that crime is sufficiently low. This idea
can conveniently be represented by making use of simple algebra.
Denote with b the monetary equivalent of the benefit a potential offender gets
from committing a certain crime, and with p and s, respectively, the likelihood and
severity of punishment associated with that crime. This notation can be used to
determine under what conditions potential criminals with various risk attitudes find
it in their best interest to commit crime. We begin with the simplest case, namely risk
neutrality.
3. Risk-Neutral Potential Criminals
Risk neutrality requires a person to base his decision only on his expected net
benefit. In other words, a risk-neutral person is an expected value maximizer. Using
the previous notation, expected net benefits are given by b − (p × s). Since b is
unaffected by the severity and certainty of punishment, the effectiveness of
punishment schemes in deterring risk-neutral individuals will depend only on the
expected sanction, which is the product of the probability and severity of the
sanction, symbolically p × s.
In the previous example,58 p = 50% and s = $500, and therefore the expected
sanction is given by p × s = $250. Increasing the probability of conviction from 50%
to 60% leads to an expected sanction of (60%) × ($500) = $300. Similarly,
increasing the punishment from $500 to $600 leads to an expected sanction of
(50%) × ($600) = $300. As this example demonstrates, equal percentage increases
in severity and certainty have the same effect on the expected punishment (i.e., on
p × s).59 And since risk-neutral individuals make decisions based only on the size of
the expected punishment, equal percentage increases in the certainty and severity of
punishment have equal deterrent effects on risk-neutral potential criminals.
4. Risk-Averse and Risk-Seeking Potential Criminals
To demonstrate how risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals differ in their
behavior, consider the following three lotteries: L = (0.5, 0.5 ; b − $500, b), L1 = (0.6,
0.4 ; b − $500, b), and L2 = (0.5, 0.5 ; b − $600, b), where b is a criminal’s benefit
from crime, and the first value in each lottery (in the form of b − $X) is the criminal
benefit net of punishment costs. It follows that L1 and L2 are obtained by increasing
by 10% the certainty and severity of punishment in the lottery L, respectively. Hence,
lotteries L1 and L2 share the same expected values, namely b − $300.60
As discussed earlier,61 when a risk-averse individual has to make a choice between
two lotteries with the same expected value, he prefers the one with less variance.
Conversely, a risk-preferring individual chooses the lottery with greater variance. It

58. See supra Part I.C.1 (expounding this example).
59. See sources cited supra note 54.
60. This can easily be demonstrated by calculating the respective expected values:
E[L1] = (0.6 × (b − $500)) + (0.4 × b) = 0.6b − $300 + 0.4b = b − $300
E[L2] = (0.5 × (b − $600)) + (0.5 × b) = 0.5b − $300 + 0.5b = b − $300.
61. See supra Part I.B.
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is relatively easy to verify that L1 has less variance than L2.62 This follows because
L1 results in a small penalty often, whereas L2 results in a large penalty less
frequently. Hence, L2 involves a more extreme distribution of events. Accordingly, a
risk-averse individual would prefer L1 over L2, and a risk-loving individual would
prefer L2 over L1.
What does this imply in terms of the effectiveness of certainty versus severity in
deterring risk-averse/loving potential criminals? Recall that L1 is obtained by
increasing the certainty of punishment, and is disliked by risk-loving potential
criminals. Conversely, L2 is obtained by increasing the severity of punishment, and
is disliked by risk-averse potential criminals. This observation leads us to the
Beckerian conclusion: an increase in certainty is more effective in deterring potential
criminals if and only if they are risk loving.63
D. Tensions Arising from the Implications of CAP
CAP was first proposed over 250 years ago. Since then, it has been supported—rather
than challenged—by modern social scientists, and there is some empirical and
experimental evidence supporting it.64 This leads us to be reluctant in challenging the
validity of CAP. A puzzling implication of CAP in Beckerian models, however, is
that criminals must be risk loving.
This conclusion is in tension with the implicit belief reflected in many studies that
even criminals are risk averse to some degree. Furthermore, it is interpreted as
suggesting that criminals are “different from the rest of the population,” who are
considered to be risk averse.65 Hence, CAP’s implications are puzzling, if not
disturbing, and this raises at least two important questions.
First, should we not rely on results and conclusions derived from economics and
criminology studies that assume criminals are risk averse (or risk neutral)? Second,
are criminals really different from the rest of the society on a dimension that has
nothing to do with their actual illegitimate benefits from crime?
While the second question is of great academic interest, the first question is
extremely important for designing policies to deter crime at the lowest cost to society.
Hence, resolving this puzzle is not only of academic value but is important for
practical concerns. Therefore, we must first investigate the following question: Can
risk aversion and CAP coexist in frameworks that incorporate broader approaches

62. To demonstrate this, let V[L1] and V[L2] represent the variances of each lottery. It
follows that:
V[L1] = 0.6 × ((b − $500) − (b − $300))2 + 0.4 × (b − (b − $300))2
= 0.6 × 2002 + 0.4 × 3002 = 24,000 + 36,000 = 60,000
and
V[L2] = 0.5 × ((b − $600) − (b − $300))2 + 0.5 × (b − (b − $300))2
= 0.5 × 3002 + 0.5 × 3002 = 90,000.
Hence, V[L1] < V[L2].
63. See Becker, supra note 2, at 178 (using expected-utility theory to prove, under his
assumptions, that certainty is more effective in deterring potential criminals if and only if they
are risk loving).
64. See supra Part I.A (providing a brief review of the historical development of CAP).
65. See Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 97.
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than simple Beckerian models? If yes, then it is perhaps the over-simplicity of
traditional Beckerian models that pushes us to falsely conclude that criminals are risk
loving. If no, then we must either accept the conclusion that criminals are risk loving,
or find a fundamental flaw common to all crime-and-deterrence models which
pushes us to falsely conclude that criminals are risk loving. In Part II, we answer this
question affirmatively.
II. RECONCILING CAP WITH RISK AVERSION
Beckerian models, just like every other economic model, make simplifying
assumptions. These assumptions may lead to abstractions from considerations that
may affect conclusions regarding criminals’ implied risk attitudes. Various scholars
have investigated the implicit assumptions in Becker’s model to determine whether
they may be responsible for the conclusion that CAP implies risk aversion. In this
Part, we review three extensions of Becker’s crime-and-deterrence model that may
reconcile CAP and risk aversion. More specifically, we review three theoretical
frameworks that demonstrate that CAP can be observed in a world where risk-averse
criminals make rational criminal decisions.
A. Domains of Risk: Imprisonment Versus Monetary Prospects
and Time Preferences
In Becker’s model, as discussed in Part I.C.2, a potential offender decides to
commit crime if his illegitimate benefit b is high, and the severity of punishment s
and/or the certainty of punishment p are low. An implicit assumption here is that b
and s are measured with the same metric. If the benefit from crime is monetary, and
if the associated punishment is also monetary, this implicit assumption may not be
harmful.
If, however, b is measured in dollars, but s is measured in years in prison, then the
criminal cannot directly compare these two values. Before he can compare these two
values, he must convert the expected punishment (which is measured in years in
prison) to dollars, or convert the monetary benefit from crime into years in prison.
There are many conceivable ways in which a unit can be converted into another.
In the case of monetary currencies, for instance, we use conversion rates. One
converts American dollars to euros by multiplying the number of dollars by the
exchange rate between dollars and euros. In this case, the conversion is simple; one
unit is a scalar product of another.
In other instances, conversion requires a more complicated calculation. Consider,
for instance, the conversion of future income into its present discounted value.66 In
this case, future earnings are discounted based on how far in the future they are
expected to be earned. As such, one cannot simply use a constant exchange rate

66. See, e.g., R. CHARLES MOYER, JAMES R. MCGUIGAN, RAMESH RAO & WILLIAM J.
KRETLOW, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 158–60 (12th ed. 2012); STEPHEN A.
ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 130–33 (10th ed. 2013) (explaining the concept of discounting and present values in
further detail).
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between future income and current income; the exchange rate depends on another
variable, namely time.
So how do criminals convert time in prison for purposes of comparing expected
punishment with expected illegitimate monetary gains? This is inherently an
empirical question. However, scholars point out several reasons as to why future time
in prison, just like future income, would probably be discounted by criminals.67 A
short list of such reasons:
i.

s usually refers to the “length of the sentence decreed by the court and not
the length of the sentence that is actually served.”68 This implies that one
puts less weight on future sentences, because a person’s probability of being
alive to serve his sentence in the future decreases in time.

ii.

“[S]ince most individuals have a positive time preference for increments of
wealth they will have a negative time preference for decreases in wealth.
Since imprisonment usually implies a decrease in wealth, an individual will
be most concerned with the wealth effects in the early years of a prison
term.”69

iii.

“[T]he first years of imprisonment may create special disutility due to
brutalization of the prisoner.”70

iv.

A person might become “accustomed to prison life or … cease[] to care as
much about those he knew from the outside.”71

If, as advocated in the existing literature, criminals discount future time spent in
prison, is it not only natural that they appear to be risk seeking over outcomes that
involve imprisonment? To answer this question, consider the extreme case where
future imprisonment is very heavily discounted by a potential criminal. Assume the
criminal faces two choices, (i) a year in prison with certainty, versus (ii) two years
in prison with a probability of 50% and no punishment with a probability of 50%.
Since the second year is heavily discounted, option (ii) is more desirable because it
involves a 50% chance of punishment that is almost only as bad as the certain
punishment in (i).72 The two choices in (i) and (ii) share the same expected
punishment of one year in prison, yet the criminal chooses the one that is more
uncertain.73 Hence, the criminal appears to be risk loving.

67. See, e.g., Block & Lind, supra note 17, at 481; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 419
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
68. Block & Lind, supra note 17, at 481.
69. Id.
70. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 419 n.27.
71. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 3.
72. This can be demonstrated through a simple utility function over sentences that
discount imprisonment in the future. Consider, for example, U(s) = −√ s.
73. When we use the utility function in the previous note, option (i) results in a net
disutility of 1, whereas option (ii) results in a net expected disutility of (0.5 × 0) + (0.5 × √ 2 )
≈ 0.71. Hence, the second option is preferred by the criminal.
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The important thing to note here is that the criminal appears to be risk loving over
uncertainties involving time in prison. The economics literature that establishes that
individuals are, in general, risk averse relies on lotteries over monetary outcomes,
not over time in prison. There is no reason, a priori, to think that people evaluate
uncertainties concerning imprisonment the same way that they evaluate uncertainties
over monetary outcomes.
In 1975, Michael K. Block and Robert C. Lind, in an article in the Journal of
Legal Studies, presented a theoretical model that essentially formalizes this idea.74
Block and Lind point out that people can have different risk attitudes over different
domains.75 In particular, they can be risk averse over monetary fines, but risk seeking
over prison sentences, and behave in a manner consistent with CAP.76 As such, CAP
does not necessarily imply that criminals are different from noncriminals in their risk
preferences.77
B. Sentences and Stigma: Implications for Risk Attitudes
Block and Lind’s argument relies on discounting of future sentences as the
rationale for criminals’ risk attitudes over sentences. Another reason as to why
criminals may display risk-seeking behavior over sentences is related to the labeling
effect that is generated by imprisonment. “A convicted criminal suffers not only from
public penalties but from stigma, the reluctance of others to interact with him
economically and socially.”78
Stigmatization, from a theoretical perspective, produces effects similar to those
produced by discounting of future jail time on criminals’ implied risk preferences.
Stigma can be thought of as simply adding what economists call fixed costs to the
psychic and physical costs of imprisonment. As such, a person would be willing to
pay a very high price for avoiding conviction, even if the punishment attached to
such conviction is a single day in prison. Hence, a person can prefer a 50% chance
of a week in jail and 50% chance of no conviction, to conviction with certainty
requiring imprisonment for a single day.79 It is easy to verify that such a choice is
consistent with risk-neutral (and risk-averse) preferences over sentences.80

74. Block & Lind, supra note 17.
75. Id. at 480–81.
76. Id. at 480–83.
77. Id. at 479 (“Using this framework we are able to explain the relative deterrent effects
of certainty and severity in punishment without imputing any special behavioral characteristics
to the class of individuals who commit offences.”).
78. Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 519, 519 (1996).
79. To demonstrate this point, let σ denote the stigma attached to conviction. A risk-neutral
individual’s expected utility from committing crime is therefore EU = b − p(s + σ) when his
disutility from imprisonment is proportional to his sentence. The expected utility of the first
option is b − 0.5(7 + σ) = b − 3.5 − 0.5σ, and his expected utility from the second option is b
− 1 − σ. He prefers the first option if σ > 5, that is, if the stigma associated with conviction is
greater than the variable cost of going to prison for five days.
80. The previous note demonstrates that a risk-neutral individual prefers the first option,
if σ > 5. This implies that slightly risk-averse individuals prefer the first option, too, when σ > 5.
See Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 142–43 (proving that if a risk-neutral person strictly
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The effect of stigmatization on criminals’ risk preferences over imprisonment
seems, at first glance, indistinguishable from the effect of discounting of future time
in prison. This is, however, not true. We just demonstrated that a person who fears
stigmatization may behave in accordance with CAP when he compares a prospect
that may result in no conviction to another prospect where all outcomes involve
conviction. But, when all outcomes in all lotteries being compared involve
conviction, a risk-neutral individual who does not discount future time in prison
cannot act in accordance with CAP. The reason is simple: all outcomes involve the
same costs of stigmatization, and since the person values each year in prison equally,
he is indifferent between two years in prison with certainty and a lottery that results
in three years in prison with 50% chance and one year in prison with 50% chance.81
This distinction between the effects of time preferences versus the effects of
stigmatization can be exploited when designing empirical methods to distinguish
between the competing (or complementary) theories as to how CAP may be
reconciled with risk aversion over monetary outcomes.82
This distinction is particularly important when one considers the incentives of two
broad groups of offenders: first-time offenders and repeat offenders. There is a priori
no reason to believe that the members of the two groups have, on average, different
discount rates for sentences in the distant future. However, members of the first group
are much more likely to suffer from stigmatization than members of the latter
group.83 This is because repeat offenders have already been stigmatized after their
first offense, and therefore the marginal stigmatization effect of the second offense
is much smaller. This distinction, too, can be exploited in empirical studies to isolate
the effect of stigma on criminals’ differential responsiveness to the certainty rather
than the severity of punishment.84
C. Monetary Sanctions, Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, and Judgment Proofness:
Implications for Risk Attitudes
As discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, uncertainties over sentences are
fundamentally different from uncertainties over monetary outcomes, and there are
reasons to believe that the revealed risk preferences over sentences do not provide
much information about criminals’ risk attitudes over monetary outcomes. But what
if we discover that CAP holds also when we only consider crimes that are punishable
solely through monetary fines? Are we to conclude that criminals must be risk
seeking over monetary outcomes? There are at least two reasons to be cautious about
jumping to this conclusion.

prefers option A to option B, slightly risk-averse people will also prefer A to B).
81. To see this, consider the expression for expected utility, supra note 79. The
person’s expected utility is b − 2 − σ from the first option, which equals his expected utility
of b − 0.5(1 + σ) − 0.5(3 + σ) = b − 2 − σ from the second option.
82. See infra Part III (discussing how empirical methods can distinguish between these
two effects).
83. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, On the Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, 48 EUR.
ECON. REV. 715, 719–21 (2004).
84. See infra Part III (discussing how empirical studies can isolate the stigmatization
effect of convictions).
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Recall that CAP implies that criminals are risk seeking in Beckerian models, and
that these models make many simplifying assumptions. Two particular assumptions
are that (i) sanctions are payable by all offenders, and (ii) the size of criminals’
benefits does not depend on whether or not they are convicted. In other words,
people, upon being convicted, are assumed to be capable of paying severe fines and
also collecting criminal benefits. Not surprisingly, these two simplifying
assumptions have similar effects on conclusions regarding criminals’ risk attitudes.
First, a criminal that is judgment-proof85 will be unaffected by an increase in the
severity of the monetary sanction simply because he does not have sufficient assets
to pay the monetary sanction in full. As such, if a large proportion of criminals are
judgment-proof, it would be only natural for increases in monetary sanctions to have
little deterrent effects. Hence, CAP would hold regardless of criminals’ risk attitudes.
Second, criminals’ illegitimate benefits can be disgorged upon conviction, which
may generate additional costs of convictions that are not accounted for via monetary
sanctions. A similar effect will be observed in cases where preventive law
enforcement methods are used. In such cases a criminal is prevented from obtaining
the illegal benefit that he seeks through crime. Therefore, in both cases,
increasing the probability of detection leads to an increase in the
expected monetary fine as well as a reduction in expected [criminal]
benefits. In contrast, an increase in the sanction increases only the
expected monetary fine but does not affect the expected benefits of
crime. Therefore, it is only natural that potential offenders
contemplating such crimes are more sensitive to increases in the
probability of detection rather than an increase in monetary fines, even
if they are risk-averse . . . .86
The second observation, but not the first, is valid in the context of crimes
punishable by imprisonment as well. It should be noted, however, that by focusing
on crimes punishable only through monetary sanctions, one can potentially isolate
the effects of forfeiture of criminals’ illegal gains, because considerations such as
criminals’ time preferences and stigmatization effects should be irrelevant in the
context of offenses punishable by monetary sanctions only.
D. Are Simplifying Assumptions Important?
The existing literature points out at least three abstractions in simple Beckerian
models which may be responsible for the (perhaps false) conclusion that CAP implies
that criminals must be risk seekers. Although these theoretical models are important
for demonstrating caveats in existing economic arguments, it is impossible to
determine whether such caveats are important by studying theories. Theoretical
models simply point out certain possibilities. Whether these possibilities are realities
is inherently an empirical question. This is why, to determine whether abstractions
in Beckerian models lead us to false conclusions, we must form testable hypotheses.

85. See generally S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45
(1986).
86. Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 141.
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III. WHY DO CRIMINALS APPEAR TO BE RISK LOVING, AND HOW CAN WE KNOW?
We have suggested that the conventional wisdom regarding criminals’ risk
preferences may be incomplete, if not misguided. Specifically, we reviewed alternate
hypotheses proposed by us and by others that could account for the standard claim
that criminals are more responsive to increases in the probability of punishment than
they are to proportionate increases in the severity of punishment without concluding
that criminals are risk loving. In this Part, we sketch out some empirical strategies
that could be used to sort these various hypotheses from the hypothesis implied by
the conventional wisdom (i.e., that criminals are more readily deterred by an increase
in the certainty or probability of receiving a punishment than they are by a
proportionate increase in the severity of a punishment).
Before we commence in laying out some potential ways to test the various
hypotheses, it is useful to note that the existing empirical evidence is somewhat weak
relative to the degree to which the conventional wisdom is held among many scholars
of crime. In the economics literature, as we already suggested, Grogger’s influential
empirical article on the topic87 actually falls short of providing credible evidence that
criminals are more responsive to increases in certainty than to increases in severity.
Block and Gerety88 come closer to providing this evidence; however, skepticism
could be warranted based on the artificial context that is often a concern about
experimental designs. Further, even in that article, there is conflicting evidence in
that their survey results suggest that both criminals and noncriminals alike appear to
be deterred by increasing the severity of the expected punishment.89
There are at least two studies that provide evidence against the general idea that
criminals exhibit CAP to a greater degree than do noncriminals. Avner Bar‐Ilan and
Bruce Sacerdote examine the effect of increasing the fines for running red lights in
San Francisco and Israel.90 They find that individuals with criminal records and
individuals with no prior criminal history exhibit the same elasticity to the increase
in the fines for the traffic infractions.91 Also, Joanna Shepherd examines the effect
of the adoption of state sentencing guidelines, finding that reduced sentencing
discretion under the guidelines is associated with more crime.92 She argues that this
is consistent with criminals being risk averse as guidelines reduce the variance of the
expected punishment.93 While the Shepherd paper does not examine the comparison
of elasticities between responses to changes in severity and certainty, it does at least
cut against the idea that criminals are risk loving. That said, David Lee and Justin
McCrary provide evidence that the elasticity of crime with respect to increasing the

87. Grogger, supra note 14.
88. Block & Gerety, supra note 2.
89. Id.
90. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, The Response of Criminals and Noncriminals to
Fines, 47 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2004).
91. Id. at 15–16.
92. Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 586 (2007).
93. Id. at 587.
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probability of arrest may exceed the elasticity of crime with respect to sentence
severity by as much as an order of magnitude.94
Although we have concerns that crime scholars have been too quick to deduce
from the empirical record that criminals are more responsive to changes in the
probability of punishment than to changes in the severity of punishment,95 we are not
willing to ignore the consensus of such scholars either. With this in mind, we lay out
some approaches that could be used to better examine any evidence that probability
elasticities exceed severity elasticities.
A. Stigma
The potential role of stigma in generating CAP-consistent behavior could be
examined by exploiting heterogeneity at the individual level. Namely, the
mechanisms through which stigma works are primarily a one-shot cost.96 Once one
is known as a criminal, the stigma attaches, leading to a loss of status, reputation, job
opportunities,97 and a host of other psychic and economic benefits. Given this, any
elasticity differential should be substantially smaller for previously convicted
individuals.
In individual-level micro data, a researcher could differentially examine the effect
of changes in the probability of punishment and the severity of punishment on the
likelihood that an individual commits a crime among those who have no previous
record and those who do have a record. In aggregate (say, state- or city-level) data,
one could interact the effects of changes in the probability of punishment and the
severity of punishment with an indicator capturing the share of the population with
a criminal record. If stigma is driving any elasticity differential, the interaction effect
between the severity indicator and the fraction of the population with a criminal
record should lead to a reduction of the direct differential between the elasticities.
Another approach might exploit heterogeneity across the stigma associated with
different crimes. For example, in communities where a drug arrest is taken to be

94. See Lee & McCrary, supra note 29, at tbl.5.
95. See Mungan & Klick, supra 17, at 147–48. It seems, at least in some cases, crime
scholars have been too quick to equate an absence of evidence regarding the effect of
increasing severity with evidence of an absence of such an effect. Arguably, the research
designs regarding elements affecting the probability of punishment (such as policing) have
been much better than the research designs examining the elements of severity (such as prison
sentences). For more on this point, see Gelbach & Klick, supra note 41.
96. See Funk, supra note 83, at 719–21; Murat C. Mungan, Reducing Crime Through
Expungements 5 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 786, 2016),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711024# [https://perma.cc
/C8WZ-M3VK].
97. See generally Harry J. Holzer, Paul Offner & Elaine Sorensen, Declining Employment
Among Young Black Less-Educated Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support, 24 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 329 (2005) (loss of current employment); John R. Lott, Jr., An
Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of
an Individual’s Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1992) (loss of reputation); John R. Lott,
Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 583 (1992) (loss
of future earning power); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937
(2003) (loss of future employment opportunities).
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indicative of little more than membership in the community, initial differentials in
elasticities should be smaller than arrests for more stigmatized crimes, and they
should be smaller than differentials observed in communities where drug crimes are
more stigmatized. If these effects are not observed, it is less likely that stigma is
playing much of a role in explaining any CAP-consistent findings.
B. Forfeiture
If the possibility of forfeiture is driving any CAP-consistent findings, essentially
the researcher is failing to adequately measure the punishment, which should include
the forfeited criminal gains in the calculation of expected loss.98 Put this way, it
becomes clear that crimes where any gain is immediately enjoyed (and, hence, not
subject to forfeiture) should not exhibit a differential between the elasticity of crime
with respect to the likelihood of punishment and the severity of punishment. More
concretely, if concerns regarding forfeiture are driving the appearance of CAP, there
should be a larger difference for crimes where any enjoyment of gains is delayed
(theft, robbery, etc.) than for crimes where any gains are more immediate (assault,
destruction of property, etc.). Along the same lines, within crime categories such as
theft, any differential should be larger for thefts where the stolen object will take
some time to use (e.g., stealing durable goods either to use or resell) as opposed to
thefts where the object can be consumed quickly (e.g., cash or drugs).
The extent to which jurisdictions engage in asset forfeiture could also be leveraged
to test the possibility that forfeiture concerns drive CAP-consistent findings. Crimes
subject to forfeiture laws and crimes occurring in jurisdictions with more active
forfeiture practices should exhibit a greater probability-/severity-elasticity
differential than crimes not subject to asset forfeiture or crimes in jurisdictions where
asset forfeiture practices are limited.
C. Discounting
In our article on the effect of discounting on criminal decision making, we use a
motivating example where a thief must wait until after his time in jail to enjoy his
booty.99 In such a context, longer jail sentences have declining marginal effects on
the criminal’s evaluation of the net benefit of committing a crime.100 For example, if
part of what deters an individual from committing a crime is the thought of having
to wait for a number of years to spend the loot, increasing the prison sentence and
the likelihood of going to prison will both reduce the likelihood of the crime being
committed. However, while a doubling of the likelihood will have a relatively large
effect, a doubling of the sentence will have less of an effect.101 This immediately

98. Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 141–44.
99. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Discounting and Criminals’ Implied Risk
Preferences, 11 REV. L. & ECON. 19 (2015).
100. Id.
101. To see this, imagine a thief who buries his $100 of loot in the fear that he will soon
be apprehended. For a jail term of 25 years and an annual discount rate of 10%, if his likelihood
of getting sent to jail (such that he must wait to enjoy his spoils) increases from 25% to 50%,
the expected value of his criminal gains drops from $77.31 to $54.62, a 29% reduction. If
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suggests an implication similar to that arising from the forfeiture concern. If
discounting is driving CAP-consistent findings, the likelihood-/severity-elasticity
differential should not arise for crimes where the gain is enjoyed immediately such
as assault or destruction of property. While this poses a problem with respect to
distinguishing the forfeiture hypothesis and the discounting hypothesis, the
discounting hypothesis only applies when the punishment involves a delay in
consumption (i.e., when jail time is part of the punishment), whereas the forfeiture
effect occurs independently of any jail time served.
D. Judgment-Proof Criminals
Using individual-level data, it may be possible to identify the extent to which the
fact that a criminal may be judgment-proof102 drives any differential between the
probability/severity elasticities. Namely, in the case of fines, individuals with more
assets should exhibit less of a differential than individuals with fewer assets. For
example, if an individual has $10,000 in assets, doubling a fine from $10,000 to
$20,000 should have no effect, while increasing the probability of punishment from
10% to 20% may have a large effect. For an individual with assets of $100,000, both
increases may have large implications for the criminal’s evaluation of the
attractiveness of the crime. For jail terms, the parallel issue involves the criminal’s
age. Increasing a jail term from 20 to 40 years may make no difference for someone
who is 60 years old, but it may have a large effect on a 20-year-old criminal.
IV. POLICY RELEVANCE
We have identified empirical approaches to disentangle the effects of
stigmatization from criminals’ time preferences over sentences, and methods to
distinguish between criminals’ risk preferences over monetary versus nonmonetary
sanctions. Next, we discuss specific reasons as to why it is important to have such
information, and how cost-effective and deterrent procedures can be designed by
relying on such information.
A. Optimal Law Enforcement
There is a very broad law and economics literature on optimal law enforcement.103
A brief examination of this literature suggests that criminals’ risk preferences play a
central role in the determination of optimal law enforcement strategies. In particular,
Polinsky and Shavell provide a brief and very informative survey of the existing
literature on law enforcement where they point out the effects of risk attitudes on
optimal law enforcement.104 They find it useful, as do we, to analyze separately the

instead, he faces a fixed 25% likelihood of arrest but his sentence doubles from 25 years to 50
years, the expected value of his criminal gains drops from $77.31 to $75.21, a 3% decline.
102. See generally Shavell, supra note 85.
103. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67 (reviewing the existing literature).
104. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20 (reviewing how different risk attitudes affect
criminals’ choices over different lotteries); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23 (providing an
analysis of risk aversion); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 413–19 (giving an excellent
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effects of criminals’ risk attitudes on effective law enforcement strategies for crimes
punishable by imprisonment and for crimes that are not.
When an offense is punishable only via monetary sanctions, “the risk aversion
of individuals tends to lower the level of the optimal fine” under a general set of
assumptions.105 This follows from two main reasons when one considers a situation
where the likelihood of punishment is fixed106: “First, lowering the fine reduces
the bearing of risk by individuals who commit the harmful act. Second, because
risk-averse individuals are more easily deterred than risk-neutral individuals, the
fine does not need to be as high to achieve any desired degree of deterrence.”107 A
similar result is obtained when the probability and magnitude of sanctions are
determined together:
In effect, when individuals are risk averse, fines become a socially
costly sanction (reflected in an increase in taxes) rather than a mere
transfer of wealth. The more risk averse individuals are, the better it is to
control their behavior by using a lower fine and a higher probability of
detection, even though this raises enforcement costs.108
As explained in Part II, individuals may have different risk attitudes over different
domains. For crimes that are punished by imprisonment, the relevant risk concept is
criminals’ risk attitude over imprisonment sentences. When criminals discount future
punishments they appear to be risk seeking over sentences.109 The risk seekingness
of criminals may reduce the optimal sentence. This follows because the deterrent
effect of lengthy sentences is low, but the cost of imprisonment is substantial.110
The ideas presented in this subpart summarize only a very small fraction of the
observations made in the existing law and economics literature on optimal law

review of optimal law enforcement strategies).
105. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 420 (demonstrating that this conclusion
holds regardless of whether there is a fixed or endogenous probability of detection in the law
enforcement model).
106. There are a few reasons as to why enforcement costs might be fixed, or where it would
be harmless to assume that they are. See generally Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General
Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088 (1991) (demonstrating that the certainty of
punishment for various crimes may be jointly determined through “general enforcement”
efforts. A good example is a police officer patrolling a neighborhood. This investment in
enforcement not only increases the probability of detecting theft but also the probability of
detecting battery, murder, rape, etc.).
107. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 415. But see Louis Kaplow, The Optimal
Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 3 (1992). As Polinsky and Shavell state, Kaplow demonstrates: “It is possible,
however, that the optimal fine is higher in the risk-averse case than in the risk-neutral case, for
the following reason. A way to reduce the bearing of risk is to deter more individuals from
committing the harmful act, for then fewer individuals will be subject to the risk of the fine.”
Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 67, at 415 n.22).
108. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 416.
109. See supra Part II.A.
110. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20 (discussing in greater detail the effect of
lengthy sentences).
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enforcement. Yet they demonstrate the central role risk preferences play in the
determination of optimal law enforcement strategies, and the importance of
disentangling the effects of time preferences from criminals’ risk attitudes over
monetary outcomes.
B. Optimal Plea-Bargaining Procedures
It is often stated that over 90% of convictions in criminal cases in the United
States are obtained through plea bargains.111 This statistic alone should demonstrate
the importance of plea-bargaining procedures and also explain why plea bargaining
has received much attention from academics.
The existing law and economics literature has identified multiple reasons as to
how plea-bargaining procedures can be designed to further social goals.112 Reduction
in case loads and litigation costs appears to be the most preferred explanation as to
why criminal justice systems should make use of plea bargains.113 Another potential
and important gain from using plea bargains is that they can be used to screen out
guilty defendants from innocent defendants in a cost-effective way.114 There are, of
course, many critiques of plea bargaining, some related to an increased role for tactics
and a reduced role for actual or demonstrable culpability in the conviction and/or the
punishment of suspects in criminal trials.115

111. E.g., Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 4, at 341; Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz,
Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 749 (1983); Avishalom Tor,
Oren Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain
Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 99 n.5 (2010) (noting the approximately 95% guilty
plea rate in small Texas counties in 2001).
112. See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Reducing False Guilty Pleas and
Wrongful Convictions Through Exoneree Compensation (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law
& Econ., Research Paper No. 14-34, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490518 [https://perma.cc/8GEY-SCVQ]; sources cited supra note 111.
113. For this and similar explanations, see, e.g., David Bjerk, On the Role of Plea
Bargaining and the Distribution of Sentences in the Absence of Judicial System Frictions, 28
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2008); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Deterrence with Multiple Defendants:
An Explanation for “Unfair” Plea Bargains, 23 RAND J. ECON. 507, 507 (1992); Gabriel
Kahn & Chester Mirsky, Special Report: The Crime Debate, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(May-June 1997), http://prospect.org/article/special-report-crime-debate [https://perma.cc
/F574-V2TP].
114. See, e.g., Grossman & Katz, supra note 111, at 749–50 (“The legal system is
fundamentally characterized by asymmetric information; the accused know whether they are
guilty, while the prosecutor never can be certain about a given defendant’s guilt or innocence.
In this environment, the plea bargain often can be chosen to serve as a self-selection
mechanism. By doing so, it contributes simultaneously to the accuracy of the legal process (by
inducing the guilty to identify themselves) and to ensuring that violators of the law are indeed
punished.”).
115. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) (“Plea
bargaining makes a substantial part of an offender’s sentence depend, not upon what he did or
his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective of
criminal proceedings. In contested cases, it substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for a
judicial determination of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above the
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Whether or under what conditions plea bargaining is a socially desirable legal
practice is a question that we do not aim to answer in this Article, as an attempt at
answering this question would warrant multiple articles. One thing is clear, however.
The answer to this question depends in part on criminals’ risk attitudes. This is
demonstrated in one of the relatively early works on plea bargaining by Grossman
and Katz, where the authors, under many simplifying assumptions, “show that if
either the defendant or society is risk averse, then the plea bargain is socially
beneficial as an insurance device.”116
Although formal economic models, such as that used by Grossman and Katz,
abstract from many relevant issues, they demonstrate the marginal impact of
criminals’ preferences on the desirability of using plea bargains. A recent article by
David Bjerk takes this approach and demonstrates the implications of criminals
discounting future sentences, and therefore being risk seeking over sentences. He
states:
[T]his can preclude the possibility of a mutually acceptable plea bargain
even when prosecutors are risk-averse. However, when plea bargains can
be struck, the plea bargain sentences will necessarily fall short of the
expected sentence from going to trial, especially for those defendants
with only moderate evidence against them. This can result in sentencing
distributions that appear far more lenient than would be implied by the
statutory sentence from conviction at trial and the relevant probabilities
of conviction at trial.117
As these articles demonstrate, the way criminals evaluate future sentences and,
accordingly, their risk preferences over sentences must be taken into account when
designing plea-bargaining procedures. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Part II,
criminals may appear to be risk seeking over sentences due to a second reason,
namely stigmatization costs of convictions.118 Incorporating this possibility in future
research may reveal that repeat offenders, who presumably suffer less from
stigmatization compared to first-time offenders,119 should be offered different plea
bargains. As such, having a better understanding of criminals’ risk attitudes and the
factors contributing to their risk attitudes is important for designing plea-bargaining
procedures that are socially desirable.

requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This
practice also deprecates the value of human liberty and the purposes of the criminal sanction
by treating these things as commodities to be traded for economic savings—savings that, when
measured against common social expenditures, usually seem minor.” (footnotes omitted)).
116. Grossman & Katz, supra note 111, at 750.
117. Bjerk, supra note 113, at 2.
118. There is an expanding law and economics literature on stigmatization and how it
affects optimal law enforcement strategies. See, e.g., Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The
Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization,
36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007); Rasmusen, supra note 78; Mungan, supra note 96; Murat
C. Mungan, Stigma Dilution and Over-Criminalization (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law,
Law, Bus. & Econ. Paper No. 14-16, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534828 [https://perma.cc/E4QH-E6WT].
119. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 96.
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C. Punishment of Repeat Offenders
Sentencing guidelines call for increased punishments for repeat offenders.120 One
among many reasons as to why this practice may be justifiable on utilitarian grounds
relates to the differential stigmatization effect of conviction on repeat offenders
versus first-time offenders.121
An intuitive assumption employed in the existing literature is that ex-convicts are
less attractive employees in the labor market.122 This being the case, crime becomes
a more attractive option for ex-convicts who are unable to find legal means of
employment. As such, deterring recidivism requires relying on increased penalties
for repeat offenders.123
Increasing the punishment for recidivists is, however, socially costly.124 This is
especially true for crimes punishable by imprisonment.125 Therefore, a trade-off
emerges between achieving higher deterrence rates for recidivists and lowering costs
of imprisonment.126 Hence, disentangling the effect of stigmatization on criminal
behavior from the effects associated with criminals’ time preferences over sentences
is important for designing optimal sentence enhancements for repeat offenders.
D. Discretion in Sentencing
One effect of giving judges broad discretion over sentencing is creating
uncertainty by increasing the variation in sentences. The deterrent effect of such
uncertainty, and therefore the deterrent effect of indeterminate sentencing, depends
to a great extent on criminals’ risk attitudes and, in particular, criminals’ time
preferences regarding imprisonment.
If criminals discount future sentences, due to reasons discussed in Part II, one
would expect the creation of such uncertainty to reduce deterrence. If, to the contrary,

120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2014).
121. Funk, supra note 83; Kaku Furuya, A Socio-Economic Model of Stigma and Related
Social Problems, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 281 (2002) (justifying escalating punishment
schemes based on stigmatization concerns); Miceli & Bucci, supra note 11; see also C.Y.
Cyrus Chu, Sheng-cheng Hu & Ting-yuan Huang, Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely,
20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (2000) (justifying escalating punishment schemes when the
justice system can lead to erroneous convictions); Murat C. Mungan, Repeat Offenders: If
They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 173 (2010) (justifying
escalating punishment schemes based on the idea that repeat offenders learn to evade
detection); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970)
(justifying escalating punishment schemes based on the possibility of accidental commission
of crimes).
122. Funk, supra note 83, at 715; Miceli & Bucci, supra note 11, at 71; Rasmusen, supra
note 78, at 519.
123. Funk, supra note 83, at 715.
124. See sources cited supra note 121.
125. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 409–11 (discussing and reviewing how
imprisonment costs are incorporated in the economic analysis of law enforcement).
126. See Murat C. Mungan, The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies
and Incapacitation, 72 MD. L. REV. 156, 206–09 (2012) (identifying this trade-off and
discussing ways to optimally address it).

2016]

IDENTIFYING CRIMINALS’ RISK PREFERENCES

819

criminals are risk averse over sentences, then one would expect high variation over
sentences to increase deterrence.
Furthermore, because people may have different risk attitudes when the sanction
is monetary versus nonmonetary, the desirability of giving decision makers
discretion may depend on whether or not the offense or crime in question is
punishable by imprisonment. If, as commonly stated in the literature, people behave
in accordance with CAP when the sanction is imprisonment, but not when it is
monetary, then it may be cost-effective to give decision makers discretion when, and
only when, the sanction is nonmonetary.
In sum, determining the deterrent effect of determinate punishment requires the
identification of criminals’ responsiveness to the certainty and severity of
punishment in different contexts; and most importantly, when the sanction is
monetary versus nonmonetary.
E. Standard of Proof
One frequently discussed issue in the economics of law enforcement literature is
the optimal standard of proof in criminal trials.127 Most of these studies focus on
risk-neutral potential offenders who are affected by the standard of proof applicable
in trials.128 The researcher is generally interested in identifying the standard of proof
that optimally trades off wrongful convictions for false acquittals.129 In fact, the
discussion is often related to the famous Blackstone ratio,130 which stems from his
statement that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer.”131 Most of these studies provide justifications for the use of high standards
of proof due to a variety of reasons, including: preventing the chilling of socially

127. See James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should
the Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1991); Kevin M. Clermont & Emily
Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2002);
Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, Deterrence Versus Judicial Error: A Comparative
View of Standards of Proof, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 193 (2005); Louis
Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) [hereinafter Kaplow A]; Louis Kaplow,
On the Optimal Burden of Proof, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1104 (2011) [hereinafter Kaplow B]; Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior, 101
AM. ECON. REV. 277 (2011) [hereinafter Kaplow C]; Henrik Lando, Prevention of Crime and
the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 33 (2009); Thomas J.
Miceli, Optimal Criminal Procedure: Fairness and Deterrence, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3
(1991); Murat C. Mungan, A Utilitarian Justification for Heightened Standards of Proof in
Criminal Trials, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 352 (2011); Matteo Rizzolli &
Margherita Saraceno, Better That Ten Guilty Persons Escape: Punishment Costs Explain the
Standard of Evidence, 155 PUB. CHOICE 395 (2013); Okan Yilankaya, A Model of Evidence
Production and Optimal Standard of Proof and Penalty in Criminal Trials, 35 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 385 (2002).
128. See, e.g., Kaplow B, supra note 127, at 1111; Mungan, supra note 127, at 359;
Rizzolli & Saraceno, supra note 127, at 400.
129. See, e.g., Kaplow B, supra note 127, at 1105; Mungan, supra note 127; Rizzolli &
Saraceno, supra note 127, at 395.
130. E.g., Rizzolli & Saraceno, supra note 127.
131. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
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desirable behavior,132 reducing punishment costs,133 and minimizing public choice
related concerns.134
A question not frequently asked is whether the implications of previous research
are equally valid when one considers offenders who have behavior consistent with
CAP. In a recent article, Professor Fisher relaxes the assumption of risk neutrality,
and argues that “[o]ne factor that justifies lowering the standard of proof to
sub-maximal levels is risk-loving tendencies.”135 Fisher’s arguments are derived
from numerical examples that assume that offenders are risk seeking.136 The
assumption of risk-seeking attitudes, in turn, is based on the idea that criminals
perceive diminishing marginal costs associated with time in prison. 137
As we have discussed earlier, there are many reasons to be cautious about making
broad statements regarding risk preferences of individuals. Moreover, it is unclear
whether the effects identified by Fisher are sufficient to weaken the justifications
offered in the previous literature for maintaining high standards of proof in criminal
trials. Nevertheless, Fisher’s study, at a minimum, demonstrates that relaxing the
assumption of risk neutrality has important consequences regarding the way we think
about the optimal standard of proof in criminal trials, and potentially other
pro-defendant rules in criminal procedure.
CONCLUSION
Criminals’ risk attitudes significantly impact the Beckerian analysis of many
punishment policies. A true understanding of such attitudes would provide lucid
policy implications concerning optimal law enforcement, plea bargaining,
repeat-offender punishment, discretion in sentencing, and even standards of proof. A
misunderstanding of criminal risk attitudes would lead to misinformed policies in
these arenas. Furthermore, because most people are assumed to be risk averse, the
conclusion that criminals are risk seekers is profoundly disturbing. For these reasons,
it is imperative to acknowledge that CAP-consistent behavior does not necessarily
imply risk-seeking attitudes.
In the face of multiple theories that reconcile CAP and risk aversion, the question
becomes one solvable solely through empirical scrutiny of these hypotheses. If
stigma drives CAP-consistent behavior, then the elasticity differential between
certainty and severity should be less observable in those who have been stigmatized
than those who have not. If forfeiture of illegal gains drives this behavior, then the
elasticity differential should be practically nonexistent for crimes where the criminal
benefit is immediately enjoyed. A similar finding when imprisonment is involved
could also support the theory that discounting causes CAP-consistent behavior.
Additionally, a study that compares the elasticity differentials exhibited by

132. Kaplow A, supra note 127; Kaplow B, supra note 127; Mungan, supra note 127.
133. Rizzolli & Saraceno, supra note 127.
134. Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal
Procedure, 15 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 61 (2007).
135. Fisher, supra note 2, at 830.
136. See id. at 825–27.
137. Id. at 823 (“[P]rospective offenders may exhibit risk-loving tendencies in light of a
diminishing marginal cost of each additional year of incarceration.”).
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individuals of different wealth concerning fines could shed light on whether
judgment proofness drives CAP-consistent behavior.
While we have largely questioned the conclusion that criminals are risk seeking,
we do not foreclose such a result. Rather, we recognize that any conclusion regarding
criminal risk attitudes would have far-reaching theoretical implications and, thus,
must be observed through precise empirical studies that account for these other
hypotheses.

